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The China of Trade and the China of the Mind 
-The role of China in the first two centuries of Tokugawa Japan-
J. A. S. Wild 
In studies of Japan's Tokugawa period (1600-1868), much has been made of the edicts of 
national seclusion decreed in the 1630s '. However, the prevalent western image of an 
isolated Japan whose inhabitants were cut off from the outside world does not match up with 
what is known of Tokugawa society and culture which were, to a considerable degree, 
orientated towards the language and classical culture of continental China. In fact, despite 
the edicts, seclusion did not really become a pillar of Tokugawa ideology until the nineteenth 
century when the bakufu authorities, believing isolation to be the best way to secure their 
hold on power, propagated the myth that such isolation had been a cardinal aspect, and was 
thus a crucial legacy, of the rule of the first shogun, Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542-1616, shogun 
1603-1605)2. 
So, while it may be accurate to say that for the two and a half centuries of Tokugawa rule 
Japan's commercial and diplomatic doors on the Western world, if not completely closed, 
were only slightly ajar, relations with her Eastern neighbors were another matter. Trade 
with the continent continued until the turn of the nineteenth century and, both on an 
intellectual and cultural level, China was an important source for the vitality of the period. 
Indeed, it has even been posited that the isolation measures of the 1630s, often identified in 
the West as being the start of Japan's seclusion, in fact, far from stopping the influx of 
Chinese influence, actually favored its escalation3 since, with Western influence to a great 
extent curtailed, it allowed for a Chinese inspired renaissance, "in which the whole breadth 
of Chinese learning came to be understood critically, comprehensively and creatively. "4 
1 For the details of the actual edicts see George Sansom, A History of Japan, 1615-1867. Dawson, 1963, 
pp36-39. 
2 Bob T. Wakabayashi, Anti-Foreignism and Western Learning, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1986, p59. 
3 Masayoshi Sugimoto & David L. Swain, Science and Culture in Traditional Japan, Tokyo: Tuttle, 
1989, p223. 
4 Sugimoto & Swain, p223. 
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The term "sakoku" (closed country), as Ronald Toby has pointed out, was meaningful 
chiefly in respect to Japan's relations with the West, and specifically the proselytizing 
Iberians, it could not so easily be applied to relations with Japan's East Asian neighbors5. It 
has also been argued that China was no less "closed" than Japan (Chinese law had kept 
Japanese out of China since 1547 when the tally trade ended), and Korea probably more so, 
and, further, that such "closure" and the regulated and limited nature of official international 
contacts were in keeping with the practice that had long been maintained in all three nations 
of only allowing trade through highly structured, institutional channels6. 
In this paper, which is in two parts, I wish to examine the role that China played in Japan 
over the period. I intend, in the first part, to consider how China functioned as a nation to 
be traded with and how the kinds of contact brought about via this trade were important for 
Japan. I will then go on, in the second part, to consider China's more abstract role, its 
function in the consciousness of Tokugawa Japan and how China, as a metaphor, was at the 
center of the development of Tokugawa political thought. 
The China of trade and contacts through trade 
During the Tokugawa period, Japan's relations with China were maintained on an informal 
basis. The bakufu rejected the possibility of formal relations which would have required 
acceptance of a tributary role in China's East Asian order since such an obviously 
subservient role was considered beneath the dignity of a sovereign Japan. That 
notwithstanding, Chinese trading junks were allowed to come to Nagasaki from ports in 
southern China and South-East Asia, but the contact was always unofficial and never on a 
diplomatic basis. The Japanese went so far as to explicitly warn that Chinese officials 
should not accompany the trading ships. 
The overseas trade was diverse. Imports to Japan included silk, other cloth goods, 
deerskins, sugar, Chinese drugs, medicines and minerals, especially saltpeter which was 
unavailable in Japan and essential to the manufacture of gunpowder. Exports consisted 
mainly of silver, copper and other metals but also included small manufactured goods like 
umbrellas, fans and art objects. The diversity of goods, though, belied the fact that silk and 
silver were far and away the most important items of trade. Japan's new rulers wanted 
5 Ronald P. Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of the 
Tokugawa Bakufu, Princeton: Princeton U .P., 1984. 
6 Tanaka Tak~o, "Japan's Relations with Overseas Countries", in John W. Hall & Toyoda Takashi, eds., 
Japan in the Muromachi Age, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977, pp 159-178. 
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Chinese silk because it was of higher quality than domestic varieties and silver was 
demanded overseas because of its use as a currency for trade and because the large amounts 
being mined in Japan made it cheaper in the archipelago than elsewhere, meaning that it 
could be acquired at low cost and exchanged abroad for a handsome profit? China's 
demand for silver was particularly high since, in addition to it being needed for currency by 
the increasing numbers of Chinese traders in Southeast Asia, it was also used in China itself 
for the payment of taxes. 
My period begins after the Tokugawa victory at the Battle of Sekigahara in 1600. As 
part of the process of consolidating power, and specifically in order to curtail the economic 
opportunities of possible rivals and to restrict Christian influence, the new shogun's regime 
decided to put foreign trade under its own direction. 
Initially, Tokugawa Ieyasu was open to the possibility of restoring relations with Ming 
China. Relations were now at their worst after Toyotomi Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea in 
1592 and 1597, but, despite this, Ieyasu was prepared to consider the resumption of a highly 
controlled tally trade with the Ming regime. Such a resumption didn't happen, however. 
In its place, the red seal system, set up originally by Hideyoshi, was expanded. This was a 
system of licensed foreign trade under which all ships trading out of Japan were obliged to 
carry licenses issued over the shogun's vermilion seal. 
Records indicate that of 350 licenses (shuinjo) issued by the bakufu before their 
discontinuation in 1631, some 43 were granted to Chinese traders, who were evidently 
willing to flout their government's embargo on contact with Japan in order to gain a piece of 
the lucrative silver trade. 
Seeking to further regulate trading, Ieyasu directed that from 1616 onwards, Chinese ships 
should only be able to do business at Nagasaki, regardless of which port they entered. 
This, it should be noted, was long before the formalization of such requirements under the 
1630s' edicts of shogun Iemitsu (1604-1651, shogun 1623-1651), and to some extent the 
directive was ignored as Chinese ships continued also to trade at Hirado. 
However, gradually trade became concentrated in Nagasaki and many of the mostly 
Kyushu based Chinese found it necessary to head there as well8• Rapidly Nagasaki came to 
7 It has been calculated that at the start of the Tokugawa period, Japan accounted for around one third of 
the world's silver output. with some estimates putting the figure at over forty percent. 
S The wako pirateitrader activity of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, had resulted in small 
communities of Chinese living in scattered "Chinatowns", particularly along the coastline in various parts 
of Japan's main southern island, Kyushu. 
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have the largest number of overseas Chinese in Japan and up until the special Chinese 
quarter, the Tojin Yashiki, was constructed at the end of the first Tokugawa century Chinese 
could be found living in all parts of the city. 
One consequence of this large Chinese community was the development, in the 1620s, of 
three temples for Chinese residents. These began as the informal activities of Chinese 
merchant leaders who later went on to invite formal incorporation by mainland priests. 
These temples then became avenues of invitation for Chinese monks, some of whom would 
later establish the Obaku temple of Mampukuji, the importance of which I shall consider 
later. 
As already noted, part of Ieyasu's concern to bring foreign trade under direct bakufu 
control was spurred by his uneasiness about the political effects of Iberian missionary 
activity. The problem was how to control missionary activity without sacrificing foreign 
trade and his solution was to seek commercial alternatives to the Portuguese. Hence his 
enthusiasm for promoting trade with Chinese merchants and the ease with which these 
Chinese could settle in Nagasaki. Rapidly, the numbers of Chinese traders grew, their ships 
brought more and more silk cloth and, as Ieyasu had hoped, this undermined the market for 
the Portuguese carrack's yarn and spoiled the relationship between the Portuguese traders 
and their Japanese merchants. By the 1620s, around 3,000 Chinese were reportedly 
resident in the city and some thirty to sixty Chinese vessels were arriving annually. 
The China trade grew to significant proportions9, dominated by the exchange of Japanese 
bullion for silk, and the bakufu derived from it a considerable profit which could be 
maintained for as long as Japanese mines continued to produce at high levels. Nagasaki 
was a city that lived on and for this foreign trade and as trade expanded so the city 
prospered. 
However, by the 1650s, Japanese mines were declining in productivity and the problem of 
bullion scarcity began to shape trade policy. This forced the gradual imposition of import 
restrictions. 
For some time the disorder of the Ming-Manchu struggles had cut into Sino-Japanese 
exchanges 10 but when, in 1683, the Manchus finally managed to gain control of Taiwan and 
9 Oba Osamu cites figures from Dutch records that show 97 Chinese junks arriving at Nagasaki in 1641. 
Oba Osamu, Edo jidai no Ni-Chu hiwa, Tokyo, 1980, p30. 
10 Most of the trading being done during the time of the struggles was in ships coming from the south, 
under the control of forces opposing the Manchus. This led, in 1661, to the Manchu rulers ordering the 
depopulation of coastal areas in southern China in an attempt to cut off supplies to the resistance. 
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win over the last pockets of resistance to their regime, bakufu leaders became concerned that 
the restoration of peace would lead to an unmanageable expansion in the China trade. 
Fears were also sparked that given the new Q'ing regime's capacity to mount overseas 
operations (as demonstrated by the subduing of Taiwan), any trade disputes could have 
serious complications, including threats to Japanese territory. 
Edo officials' fears seemed to be being realized when peace did indeed see a rapid 
escalation of the China trade ll . Although by this time the export of silver was being 
restricted, the market had shifted to copper and, as previously with silver, this resulted in a 
dramatic drain of copper out of the country. Consequently, in 1685, the measures of trade 
restraint known as the "regulations of the Jokyo era" were imposed. Now trade was to be 
restricted to 6,000 kan 12 of copper for the Chinese and half that for the Dutch. One 
outcome of this was that legitimate trade became severely limited, and this led to an increase 
in smuggling. In order to counter this illegal trading, Edo perceived it necessary, amongst 
other things, to establish firm control over Nagasaki's Chinese community, hence the 
confining of the community to the newly built Chinese residence in 1689 13 . 
Gradually the problems stemming from the Manchu conquest of the mainland, including 
the fear of Manchu invasion, subsided. But Edo's efforts to contain trade, while they were 
successful in preventing expansion, did little to shrink trade volume and, to the extent that 
bullion scarcity was Edo's key concern, it was a problem that did not go away. Domestic 
demand for gold, silver and copper was growing along with the economy, and the scarcity of 
gold and silver was beginning to disrupt currency values and commodity prices in the 
domestic market. Responding initially to the problem of silver, shortages of bullion were 
such a serious concern that the bakufu, in 1688, placed a general ban on the export of silver 
and, in its place, promoted the export of copper which was in great demand in China because 
the Q'ing were minting a new coinage. However, copper mines too, by early in the 
eighteenth century, were beginning to be exhausted. Consequently, metal exports, once 
11 Records indicate that in 1688, 193 junks arrived. 
12 I kan = approx. 3.75 kg. 
13 It is recorded that in its first year, the seven acres of the residence housed 4,888 people when the junk 
fleet was in port. See Marius B. Jansen. China in the Tokugawa World, Cambridge: Harvard U.P., 1992, 
pp29-30. Jansen goes on to describe the restrictions: "The Chinese were allowed to leave the quarter 
only for authorized purposes to handle freight, service ships or visit temples, and then only when 
accompanied by Japanese petty officials ...... .ln time, however, the severity of these regulations was 
moderated. and by late Tokugawa days it was not unusual to find Chinese traders hawking their goods on 
the streets of Nagasaki." 
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viewed by bakufu officials as a source of material advantage, came to be seen as a source of 
material harm since supplies of precious metals for coinage were dwindling. Thus, the 
policy of trade containment was replaced by one of trade reduction. To this end, the 
"Shotoku regulations", instituted in 1715, tightened the 1685 measures and effected a 
gradual but substantial shrinkage of trading activity. As a result, by the end of the 
eighteenth century, the China trade had slowed to a trickle l4 • 
Trade regulations were not the only actions taken to protect bullion supplies, there were 
also calls for Japan to eliminate imports by producing the same goods at home, and a 
program of import substitution was begun which, by the 1720s, under the encouragement of 
the shogun Tokugawa Yoshimune (1684-1751, shogun 1716-1745), became a major part of 
trade policy. 
The most important import substitution program was the development of sericulture, as 
the bakufu created an industry to free Japan from its dependence on Chinese silk. 
With an assiduity comparable to that of the second half of the nineteenth century, when 
the Japanese set about learning Western technology, Chinese treaties on sericulture were 
brought into Japan, studied, and then Japanese works on the subject were written and 
distributed. In due course the entire process of the silk industry, from rearing worms and 
cultivating mulberry trees to the finished products, was established throughout most of the 
country and Japan became self-sufficient in the product which hitherto she had been most 
dependent upon obtaining from China and this, in turn, meant her previous balance of 
payments problems improved considerably 15 • 
Clearly then, the China trade played an important function in Tokugawa Japan. For the 
bakufu it offered a channel to international markets that did not threaten internal stability in 
the way that trade with the Iberians did. In fact, despite its heavily regulated nature, the 
China trade could almost be described as apolitical in so far as it remained unsanctioned by 
the authorities in Beijing. Trade also provided lUxury goods for a growing Japanese market 
and it also helped to consume the large stocks of precious metals that the Tokugawa 
authorities had overseen the mining of during their consolidation of power. As those stocks 
diminished, trade also had the effect of prompting programs of import substitution in 
14 Oba gives figures charting the decline from 40 junks in 1717. to just 10 junks in 1791. Edo jidai no 
Ni-Chu hiwa. p33. 
15 In the long term. the domestic production of silk was to have profound consequences, since. after 
reopening to international trade with the West in the mid-nineteenth century, it was raw silk and silk 
products which became Japan's major item of export to Europe and a main source of capital used to 
subsidized the country's program of industrialization. 
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commodities, like silk, that it had helped to create a wide demand for, and these programs 
helped to diversify the Japanese domestic economy. 
The China trade was the lifeblood of Nagasaki and was also important for Kyoto, where 
the major industry was the Nishijin silk industry, which, until the domestic industry took off 
in the 1720s, depended upon Chinese imports for the bulk of its yam. For Osaka, as well, 
the trade was important, mainly because metalworks in the city provided much of the export 
copper. 
Specifically, then, Japan's foreign trade with China was important to certain groups and 
localities but, to put things in perspective, studies have shown that it was only a minor part 
of the total Japanese economy, the heart of which was domestic activity l6. However, that 
notwithstanding, the real significance of trading activity was the channels for other kinds of 
contact that it kept open. 
Commodity exchange was not the only way in which the China trade was important for 
Japan. In addition to merchandise, the junks from China also brought books and people 
who were not connected to the trading activities. They also brought news from the outside 
world. This news was in the form of reports, known as Jusetsugaki, which, after 1644, 
Chinese and Dutch ship captains were ordered to prepare and hand over to Nagasaki officials 
with each arrival. These reports were forwarded immediately to the top authorities in Edo 
and, thanks to this requirement, Japanese authorities, despite their isolation, were able to 
remain remarkably well informed of events beyond their borders, like the progress of the 
Manchus in the civil war on the mainland I7. 
As literacy in Japan grew, so accomplishment in the Chinese classics became an index of 
cultural attainment, and the demand for books rose. This led to Chinese books, excepting 
any related to Christianity, being imported in increasingly large quantities. Books thus 
constituted another important part of the Nagasaki trade. 
The bakuJu was quickly aware of the implications, both positive and negative, of Chinese 
book imports. Educated Japanese could be expected to be literate in Chinese and the 
bakuJu encouraged Confucian studies. The access to specific tomes and the ability to order 
additional titles through Nagasaki were also instrumental in the development of specific 
16 Conrad Totman estimates the value of foreign trade in 1700 to have been less than 1.5% of domestic 
agricultural production. See Conrad Totman, Early Modern Japan, Berkeley: University of Califomia 
Press, 1993, p148. 
17 Stepping briefly outside of my timeframe, the jusetsugaki provisions also enabled nineteenth century 
Edo officials to receive early warning of the Western powers pushing further into East Asia. 
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areas of knowledge, for example, calendrical astronomy, medicine and certain aspects of 
mathematics. China's administrative codes were also studied in order to find an appropriate 
model of administrative organization for adoption in Japan. However, along with the 
benefits, there was also an acute awareness of the potential danger of foreign texts. After 
the restrictions on religious thought and practice that accompanied the seclusion measures of 
the 1630s, imported Chinese books were subjected to a stringent censorship process to 
prevent the infiltration of Christianity via the written word. Bakufu appointed censors were 
instructed to report the appearance at Nagasaki of any works containing Christianity, 
military matters or rr anything unusual rr, and a list of banned books was compiled and 
circulated to book dealers. The censorship system also benefited the bakufu in that it gave 
Edo officials a regular preview of incoming material, since the Nagasaki censors, in their 
caution, usually sent to Edo summaries of material they were unsure about. This 
communication worked in the other direction as well, as officials were offered access to 
foreign books by the censorship system enabling the ordering from overseas of desired 
tomes, and this greatly aided the growth of major daimyo collections and the bakufu's 
Momijiyama library. 
The channel of access to foreign books was most vigorously exploited by the shogun 
Yoshimune. In 1720, in pursuit of a policy of agricultural development (part of the 
program of import substitution), he ordered Kaga's daimyo to present him with a Chinese 
thousand volume set of botanical lore and, the following year, in order to facilitate the study 
of Chinese botany, he lightened the general proscription on books from China, specifying 
only that they not be about Christianity. After this, it became possible to import not just a 
greater variety of Chinese books, but also Chinese versions of European books on science, 
medicine, astronomy and geography, which had previously been banned on the grounds that 
they had been written by Jesuits. 
The China trade was now not just important for the importation of Chinese merchandise 
and learning, it was also the source of translated Western texts, which would inspire a whole 
new school of learning later in the Tokugawa period. 
Yoshimune, in his program to investigate Japan's botanical resources, did not just seek 
books from China, he also ordered Chinese seeds and seedlings and also invited Chinese 
experts to Nagasaki to investigate the countryside and identify plants in order to compile 
lists of native botanical equivalents to Chinese species. But botany was not his only 
pursuit, it is well known that Yoshimune's interests were highly eclectic and, in pursuit of 
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these interests, he invited many other specialists - scholars, doctors and veterinarians - to 
come to Japan from China to share their expert knowledge, and these people then played 
important roles in Japan's development. 
Other important men came to Japan after receiving their invitations from the Chinese 
living in Nagasaki. 
The Zen Master Yin-yuan, known in Japan as "Ingen", came to Nagasaki on invitation 
from the Kofukukuji temple in 1654, and brought disciples with him to teach a more literal 
interpretation of the Buddhist precepts. His reputation quickly spread and he was invited to 
Kyoto where he had audiences with the retired emperor 00 Mizunoo. Shortly afterwards, 
in Edo, he gained the patronage of the then shogun, Tokugawa Ietsuna (1641-1680, shogun 
1651-1680). With such powerful support, Ingen lobbied for and was able to gain 
permission to construct a huge temple complex, the Mampukuji, in present-day Uji, near 
Kyoto. This temple, founded in 1661, was marked for its Buddhist architecture, 
characteristic of Ming dynasty China, and became the center of the Obaku Zen sect of 
Buddhism l8 . 
Until 1740, all Mampukuji abbots were Chinese from the parent temple in Fukien, China, 
then Chinese alternated with Japanese clerics until 1786, after which only Japanese monks 
succeeded to the abbacy. 
Mampukuji monks were welcome at the highest levels of Edo sociew and they had a 
considerable influence upon Japanese literati artists and scholars, especially in the art of 
calligraphy. Their coming coincided with the Oenroku era, known for its prosperity, 
cultural blossoming and, some would say, extravagance. During this period, the court of 
the fifth shogun, Tokugawa Tsunayoshi (1646-1709, shogun 1680-1709), who was a keen 
student of the Confucian tradition, and the promoter of legislation ordering compassion for 
all living thingsl9, welcomed many Chinese scholar monks from the Obaku temple to assist 
them in the study of the Confucian classics, and these monks can be seen to have had some 
influence upon the intellectual debate surrounding appropriate Confucian teaching, which 
was current at the time. 
At around the same time that Obaku Buddhism was reaching Japan, a number of loyalist 
Ming Confucianists arrived seeking assistance and refuge from the Manchu invasion. 
Scholars had traditionally been regarded in China as interpreters of the Will of Heaven, so 
18 Currently the third largest Zen sect in Japan. 
19 Tsunayoshi's concern for the welfare of dogs led him to be named inu kubou. the "dog shogun". 
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with the fleeing to Japan of Confucian scholars after the fall of the Ming Empire, this, along 
with the disorder on the mainland, was interpreted in Japan as proof that a war-tom and now 
"barbarian" (Manchu) ruled China had lost the mandate of heaven, which had evidently been 
transferred, along with the scholars, to peaceful and orderly Japan, which was therefore the 
legitimate heir of Ming China. 
About twenty scholars found refuge in Japan between the fall of the Ming in 1644 and the 
ascendance of the Kang Xi Emperor (a great patron of scholars), in 1661. Foremost 
amongst those who settled was the Ming loyalist Confucian scholar, Shu Shunsui (1600-
1682), who first arrived at Nagasaki in 1642 and, after repeated failures to organize an anti-
Manchu front in Annam, south China and Japan, was allowed to settle in Nagasaki in 1659. 
In 1665, Tokugawa Mitsukuni (1628-1700), the Lord of Mito and a grandson of Ieyasu, 
invited Shu to Edo to serve as his tutor and advisor. At that time, Mitsukuni was engaged 
in the monumental project of assembling a group of scholars to compile the history of Japan 
(the Dai Nihon Shi) on the model of the official Chinese histories and he was eager to enlist 
the support of a Chinese scholar of Shu's caliber. 
The Dai Nihon Shi was written in literary Chinese, infused with Confucian doctrines and 
followed the format of Chinese official historiography. Mitsukuni's main purpose in 
commissioning the history was to establish Confucian principles defining the correct 
relationship between ruler and ruled, "to indicate the legitimate emperors of Japan and to 
exemplify the proper attitude of subjects towards the imperial house". By doing this, he 
was aiming to console the tradition that claimed for the Japanese imperial lineage a unique 
function as "the embodiment, mystic or symbolic, of Japanese society and nationhood."2o 
Shu had a deep impact on Mitsukuni and on some of the other scholars with whom he was 
compiling the Dai Nihon Shi and, in 1693, his disciple Asaka Tampaku was appointed head 
of the Shokokan, the bureau in charge of putting together the history. Through Asaka and 
other scholars, Shu influenced the early Mito school as well as the school of National 
Learning (Kokugaku) which developed from it2l. 
Shu settled in Japan because he refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Q'ing, but in 
doing so he lent credence to the idea that Japan was the only country where Confucian ideals 
could be fully implemented. In a letter to Tokugawa Mitsukuni, Shu wrote that because 
20 Herschel Webb, "What is the Dai Nihon Shi?", Journal of Asian Studies, 19-2, Feb.1960, p35 & p39. 
21 See Kate Wildman Nakai, "Tokugawa Confucian Historiography: The Hayashi, Early Mito School, 
and Arai Hakuseki", in Peter Nosco, ed., Confucianism and Tokugawa Culture, Princeton: Princeton 
U.P., 1984, pp62-91 
- 38-
The China of Trade and the China of the Mind 
China could no longer achieve the great principle of harmony, it was for Japan, under such 
benevolent rulers as Mitsukuni, to realize that ideal. In this way, Shu can be seen to have 
aided the transformation of the Chinese centered concept of loyalty to the Ming into the 
Japan-oriented idea that Tokugawa Japan, rather than Q'ing China, was the old regime's 
legitimate heir. 
The i~fluence of Chinese expatriates was also apparent in other fields. Chen Yuanyun 
(1587-1671), introduced Chinese martial arts into Japan. At this time also, "Ming-Q'ing 
music" first became popular in Nagasaki and then gained a somewhat wider following in the 
main population centers, and Chinese Nagasaki painters, largely unknown in China, 
established reputations in Japan far beyond the worth of their derivative styles. 
The influence of contact with China can also be identified in the models for social and 
institutional engineering adopted under several shoguns as they attempted to structure and 
stabilize Tokugawa society. As has already been mentioned briefly, the administrative 
codes of China provided most appropriate models for adoption and, to this end, government 
sponsored scholarship, sometimes binational in character, was promoted to find, interpret 
and implement the most suitable Chinese models. The resulting Tokugawa studies of Ming 
law led to the recovery of much of the administrative record that was lost in the disorder of 
the Sengoku (warring states) period. 
Tokugawa Ieyasu's search for literature on law and precedent was motivated by its 
relevance to his regulation of the court nobility. Precedent was a way to legitimize the 
resolution of disputes, but finding people competent enough in the relevant laws to be able 
to cite such precedents proved difficult. 
Progress was made under Tokugawa Tsunayoshi in the late seventeenth century, and it 
was the presence of Ming emigre scholars that facilitated this progress. The practical 
problems of rule were now a primary concern for the bakufu and the apparent 
comprehensiveness of the Chinese examples, particularly the penal codes, made the model 
attractive. Efforts were made to acquire the Ming codes of law through Nagasaki, and Shu 
Shunsui, at the time working in Edo on the Dai Nihon Shi, was one of those consulted for 
help with the interpretation of the text of the codes22 . 
In the process of interpreting and implementing Ming legal codes, certain kinds of moral 
injunction were also translated and adopted. The Tokugawa jikki23 notes how the Liu yu 
22 Dan Fenno Henderson, "Chinese Legal Studies in Early Eighteenth Century Japan: Scholars and 
Sources," lournal of Asian Studies, 3D, Nov .1970, pp21-56. 
23 The official Tokugawa history, compiled in the early nineteenth century. 
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yen-i (the amplification of the six maxims) was translated. 
The six maxims, first issued by the Ming founding emperor, T'ai-tsu, in 1398, and then 
expanded upon and frequently reprinted in late Ming and early Q'ing times, were six simple 
precepts for inculcating public virtue: respect for parents, for elders and superiors, harmony 
in the village, instruction for children and grandchildren, contentment with one's lot and 
livelihood, and abstention from wrong. These moral pronouncements, often reiterated by 
China's Confucian rulers, can be seen as one tool used by the Edo officials to strengthen the 
respect for authority in Japan. Shogun Yoshimune ordered a simplified translation of the 
Lui yu-yen-i prepared for use in lower schools and there are records of daimyo who ordered 
village leaders to explain its virtues at monthly village gatherings called for that purpose. 
Records also indicate the presence of traveling lecturers, often samurai, who were patronized 
by certain daimyo to travel through the communities in their domains lecturing on morals 
and the positive benefits found in submitting to authority. Stress was usually placed upon 
the importance of contentment with one's lot and appreciation for the concern shown by 
those who ruled (two maxims that authorities even today seem eager to stress)24. 
Yoshimune's encouragement of the study of Ming law led to the publication, by Ogyu 
Soraj25, of a commentary on the Ming codes and also to further studies in T'ang law and to 
major projects devoted to the interpretation of the Q'ing codes. These studies of the 
Chinese system of law culminated in the publication, in 1742, of the legal code known as the 
Kujikata Osadamegaki, consisting of two parts. The first part outlined administrative 
procedures and civil regulations in 81 articles. The second part laid out criminal laws and 
penalties in 103 articles. This legal code became the most important body of law under the 
Tokugawa shogun ate and remained in effect until the Meiji Restoration in 1868. 
Direct access to Chinese nationals at Nagasaki was important to the scholarly 
achievements of many of these officially sponsored projects. One example, cited by 
24 Marius B. Jansen, China in the Tokugawa World, Cambridge: Harvard U.P., 1992, pp67-69. Jansen 
goes on to point out the " ... clear link between these injunctions and the larger diffusion of Confucian 
morality in Edo times and the reverential position that was accorded the 1890 Imperial Rescript on 
Education in imperial Japan." He also quotes the rescript, "Ye, Our subjects, be filial to your parents, 
affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends be true; bear 
yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all." 
25 Ogyu Sorai (1666-1728), is considered by many to be the most influential Confucian philosopher of 
the Tokugawa era. An adviser to two shoguns, he had an even greater impact upon the world of letters 
and ideas. Sorai is given good coverage in Maruyama Masao's, Studies in the Intellectual History of 
Tokugawa Japan, University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo, 1974. 
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Jansen, was of Ch'en Hsieh-an who came to Nagasaki in 1727 and worked with the Japanese 
to explicate documents on T'ang law sent from China. It is recorded that, as an eminent 
scholar, Ch'en was honored with gifts from the shogun and allowed many special privileges, 
including being able to live outside the Nagasaki Chinese residence26 . 
The China of the mind 
Having examined the nature and importance of the actual physical contacts between the 
two countries during the period, I wish now to turn to more abstract fare, to consider the 
changing role that China played as a concept in the Japanese people's consciousness. 
The perception of China and Chinese influence was obviously different depending upon 
social class, and, more specifically, the opportunities for literacy and sophistication. 
Prominent Sinologists, like Ogyu Sorai, who devoted their lives to the study of Chinese 
civilization were in a different category from less lettered samurai, whose values may have 
centered on fighting spirit, and both were even more removed from the general mass of 
commoners, whose horizons were ordinarily restricted to affairs concerning their own 
localities. 
As scholarship developed through the seventeenth century, the central function of China 
was ensured by the resurgence of Confucianism. I would like, first, to consider the 
sociopolitical context in which this upsurge in Chinese thought and learning occurred. 
After the Battle of Sekigahara, the victorious Tokugawa Ieyasu, based in Edo, established 
hegemony over the nearly 300 daimyo who exercised semiautonomous rule in their 
respective domains. The unstable social conditions of the previous warring states period -
civil strife, shifting alliances and unsettling Western contacts - were then reversed as Ieyasu 
secured his peace and took measures to stabilize the society and consolidate his new regime. 
There followed the gradual implementation of regulatory legislation that sought to control 
material consumption and daily behavior by linking them to a highly stylized system of 
hereditary social stratification and high moral principles drawn from Confucian doctrines. 
However, while this extensive regulation applied to the world of material things, on an 
intellectual level the boundaries of acceptable thought were only roughly defined. With the 
exceptions of Fujufuse Buddhism27 and Christianity, there were few taboos, so considerable 
26 ibid. pp. 70-7l. 
27 A particularly uncompromising branch of the Nichiren sect of Buddhism. It maintained a purist 
doctrinal position and its exhortative approach got it into trouble with the authorities. 
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space for intellectual enquiry existed and, with peace rendering their military skills 
redundant, the large samurai class - a fairly constant five to six percent throughout the rise in 
population from about 18 million to 30 million in the first half of the Edo era - increasingly 
turned to schooling, teaching and writing. Gradually, as the seventeenth century 
progressed, an intelligentsia emerged, Confucianism was accorded official recognition and a 
new class of Confucian scholar was born. 
The national academic infrastructure took on new shape as the bakufu appointed its own 
Confucian teachers, promoted Confucian training of samurai, and sponsored libraries and 
printing. Many feudal domains followed suit, assigning their own Confucian teachers, 
founding the hanko (domain schools), and supporting the collection and publication of 
books. The schools were generally independent operations and their curricula varied, but 
Confucianism and Chinese learning were central to all of them. 
In peace time, the bakufu was concerned to see the samurai class decommissioned. 
Hence these former military specialists were enjoined, both on a national level by the bakufu 
and locally by the han (daimyo domains), to master as complimentary disciplines both the 
literary and martial arts, in order that they might assume the role of civil administrators. 
This idea was enshrined in the new regime'S first body of national law, the laws for the 
military households known as the Buke Shohatto, and was endlessly reiterated in 
government admonitions. Justifying such exhortations, a classic Chinese aphorism was cited, 
"On the left hand literature, on the right hand use of arms", both had to be pursued 
concurrently since this was the rule of the ancients28 . 
The literature of the "left hand" was focused chiefly on the Chinese classics and 
especially on Confucianism, which the bakufu recognized as a potential ideological buttress 
to the military's dominant role in the social hierarchy. Although the Confucian cannons as 
interpreted in the Ming could in no way be construed as militarist, they did, as I indicated 
earlier, support an authoritarian, stability oriented and hierarchic order, and this was 
sufficient to recommend them to Japan's warlord leadership. 
And so it came to be that learned men of the military classes made up the mainstream of 
intellectuals and bureaucrats in the Edo period, and the overall cultural ethos diffused under 
this samurai leadership was a fusion of Confucian and martial ideas. From this fusion the 
Japanese ruling classes acquired a high respect for learning and cultivated a military inspired 
discipline to obtain it. These conditions prompted the scholar Murayama Masao to declare 
28 David John Lu, Sources of Japanese History, New York: McGraw-HilI, 1974, p20l. 
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that "Tokugawa [was] the golden age of Confucianism in Japan."29 
As I have already mentioned, a major concern of the new class of samurai intellectuals 
was to justify the Tokugawa regime and, more broadly, to legitimize the samurai's privileged 
position in society. An early formulation by Hayashi Razan30 anchored samurai privilege 
in Confucian doctrine: 
"The five relationships governing ruler and subject, father and son, husband and wife, 
older and younger brother, and friend and friend have been in existence from olden days to 
the present. There has been no change in these basic relations and they are thus called the 
supreme way .. .In everything there is an order separating those above and those below ... we 
cannot allow disorder in the relations between ruler and subject, between those above and 
those below. The separation into four classes of samurai, farmers, artisans and merchants, 
like the five relationships, is part of the principles of heaven and is the Way which was 
taught. ,,31 
Needless to say, this rationale for samurai supremacy, with its premise of an ageless and 
sanctified "Way" which society ought to follow, gained currency among the elite in both 
Kyoto and Edo. 
Chinese doctrines in addition to being used to sanction samurai privilege in general, also 
served to legitimize the specific regime of the Tokugawa. From Ieyasu's day forward, 
Tokugawa leaders actively employed cultural devices to lend credence to their rule and 
scholar advisors, like Razan, contributed to this effort. Again most notable were the 
invocation of the concept of a Heavenly Way, tendo, and the claim that the mere existence of 
the regime was sufficient indication of divine ordinance in accordance with the Way. "When 
as ruler of the realm, one enjoys trust and support, tendo accepts [that ruler's] authority over 
the realm ... "32. 
In 1652, when for the first time a child held the shogunal title, a succession that might 
have left the Tokugawa family's legitimacy open to question, their cause was bolstered by a 
new historical work, Nihon odai ichiran, according to which Ieyasu had received the 
Confucian Mandate of Heaven at Sekigahara when " ... evildoers and bandits were 
vanquished, and the entire realm submitted to Lord Ieyasu, praising the establishment of 
29 Maruyama, p7. 
30 Hayashi Razan (1583-1657), an important Neo-Confucian scholar of the early Edo period. He is most 
known as the promoter of Shushigaku as the shogunate's favored school of Confucian learning. 
31 Lu, p236. 
32 Totman, p170. 
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peace and extolling his martial virtue."33 Submission and praise from the realm were 
enough to indicate Ieyasu's receipt of the divine mandate. 
So we can see that Chinese concepts helped to maintain the Tokugawa order and its 
hereditary samurai elite. This was possible because scholars developed arguments that 
successfully naturalized ideas of Chinese provenance, relating them effectively to 
indigenous traditions and enabling them to fit in with the prevailing Japanese conditions. 
The best efforts of these scholars however could not disguise the fundamental differences 
between dynastic China and feudal Japan. Chinese institutes of learning were, to a large 
extent, channels for the open selection of the ablest minds for public service, while learning 
in Japan was officially promoted to train only those whose right to rule was hereditary. 
The process of naturalizing Confucian thought, then, was a complex one that demanded, 
as Conrad Totman puts it, "philosophical hairsplitting and a tad of sophistry." It involved 
transforming ideas from an initial form which presented Chinese culture as unique and 
superior, to forms in which cultural elements were interpreted either as universal phenomena 
found in China and Japan alike, or else as evidence of Japan's cultural superiority. From 
early in the seventeenth century onwards, this process of ideological manipulation and 
transvaluation was engaged in by scholars and it could, perhaps, be viewed as a kind of 
philosophical import substitution program, presaging the commercial one. 
The first task was to establish that the Way of the Sages was universal and not exclusively 
Chinese, so that it could apply to Japan as well. To do this, Confucianism needed to be 
separated from the Chinese world order that designated Japan as a barbarian land. Razan 
achieved this by linking the Japanese native Shinto concept of deity, kami, with Confucian 
categories. Kami, according to Razan, "is the soul of heaven and earth", which were the 
two basic categories of Confucian thought. Kumazawa Banzan34 extended this, arguing 
that the Confucian Way was universal and synonymous with Shinto. "That the Way is the 
Shinto of heaven and earth is the same as that there are not two suns in the sky ... One may 
say that it is the way of the kami (Shinto) of Japan while at the same time it is the way of the 
sages of China."35 
A subsequent stage was one in which scholars sought to substitute Japanese concepts for 
33 Nakai. p79. 
34 Kumazawa Banzan (1619-1691), was more of an eclectic popularizer than a systematic philosopher, 
and was best known for his writings on moral and social problems of the day. 
35 Quoted in Kate Wildman Nakai, "The Naturalization of Confucianism in Tokugawa Japan: The 
Problem of Sinocentrism". Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies. 40-1, June 1980. p161 & p163. 
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the Chinese originals by emphasizing areas in which Japan might be considered superior to 
China. One scholar engaged in this task was Yamaga Sok036 who, in 1675, described how 
he overcame his initial excess of Sinophillia. Having read extensively about China he 
wrote that he had been mistaken to think that Japan was inferior to its neighbor and that 
China was the only possible birthplace for a sage. Noting that "wisdom, humanity and 
valor are the three virtues of a sage", he set out to show that in those terms Japan was 
superior to China. Writing at a time when China was still unsettled after the Manchu 
overthrow of the Ming, Soko stressed how the Japanese imperial line had reigned 
uninterrupted "from the age of the gods" thanks to the loyalty of its subjects and the absence 
of "intrigues or outrages by rebels and traitors". This longevity bore testimony to the 
wisdom, humanity and virtuous nature of the rulers. As for valor, Soko asserted that "no 
alien had conquered even part of Japan," whereas Japan had twice conquered Korea and had 
"always won martial glory throughout the world." So that by the criteria of "wisdom, 
humanity and valor", he concluded, "we find that Japan is far superior" to China3? 
A further argument was also developed, that true Confucian institutions had been 
preserved in Japan after being abandoned in China. It was maintained that China had 
become corrupted while Japan remained pure. China had been invaded and conquered by 
the barbarian Manchus and since the "Great" Ming dynasty had fallen, it was no longer 
appropriate to use the honorific term "Great". Instead the term could properly be used to 
describe the Japanese themselves, since the Way of the Sages was better upheld in Japan 
than in China and geographically, Japan, surrounded by the four seas, was in a stronger 
position than China, which was surrounded and periodically conquered by the four 
barbarians38 . 
By the start of the eighteenth century, scholars inspired originally by Chinese teachings 
had revitalized the domestic intellectual legacy and used it to adapt Confucian thought into 
an acceptable form for Japan. Totman makes the point that this adaptation of Chinese 
systems of thought "established precedents for the later adoption and adaptation of other 
alien ideas. At the same time they had created a basis for repudiation of Sinocentricism 
and, beyond that, repudiation of any body of "foreign" ideas."39 
36 Yamaga Soko (1627-1685), was the earliest of the Ancient Learning, kogaku, advocates. Originally a 
student of Razan, he attended and was influenced by the Edo lectures of Shu Shunsui, after which he 
criticized the abstract theories of Neo-Confucianism and called for a return to the Confucian sages. 
Soko is most famous for formulating what came to be known as bushido, the Way of the Warrior. 
37 Totman, p174. 
38 Jansen, p79. 
39 ibid. p176. 
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The naturalization of Confucianism was accompanied by a movement in scholarship 
towards the development and elucidation of Japan's own legacy and it was this school of 
nativist scholars who set about undermining the China of their Confucian contemporaries. 
These were the scholars of national learning, the kokugakusha, who emerged in the 
eighteenth century to advocate the rejection of much of the Chinese cultural legacy. 
Motoori Norinaga40 , asserting that the Japanese, as inheritors of the Chinese tradition, had 
carried it to new heights, railed against the entire cultural tradition associated with the Sages. 
According to him, China was a country of violence and disorder and the so-called Sages 
were nothing more than a bunch of frauds peddling deceits that had erroneously become 
popular. A solid grounding in Japanese values enabled one to recognize the full error of the 
Way of China and only those who had come to this realization could usefully study Chinese 
books41. "If one wishes to penetrate .. .into the spirit of the true Way, then one must purify 
oneself from the filthy spirit of Chinese writings and proceed to the study of the ancient texts 
[of Japan] with the pure spirit of the sacred land. If that is achieved one will come to know, 
gradually that we are not obligated to the Way of China. But to know this is to receive the 
Way of the kami itself." 
So it can be seen, as Harry Harootunian has pointed out, that in Tokugawa Japan the 
China of the mind functioned metaphorically42. Initially it was associated with moral 
concepts such as tendo and the five relationships, indeed, it was the metaphor for civilization 
itself. But this was a civilization removed from any real historicity - China was referred to 
as Chuka, the central florescence, an abstract term dislocated both temporally and 
geographically from the real China. It was Chuka that was revered as the home of the 
sages and Chuka that was the model for ethical conduct that was the standard for thousands 
in their ascent to civilized life. But as Harootunian also makes clear, the notion of Chuka 
also created problems since, "(the) most apparent purpose of [the Chuka metaphor] was to 
dramatize the opposition of inner and outer, civilization and barbarism,"43 the civilization of 
the Central Kingdom and the barbarism of the periphery, including Japan. 
For the bakuju and Tokugawa scholars, this designation of Japan as barbarian presented 
40 Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801), was the scholar most responsible for bringing the National Learning 
movement (kokugaku) to its culmination. 
41 Jansen, p82. 
42 Harry D. Harootunian, "The Functions of China in Tokugawa Thought", in Iriye Akira, ed., The 
Chinese and the Japanese. Princeton: Princeton U .P. 1980. pp9-36. 
43 ibid. plO. 
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problems. The bakufu, wishing to confirm its growing autonomous structure of legitimacy, 
was not prepared to have itself subjugated according to the so called "Chinese world order" 
and so declared itself independent of that order and established an alternative Japan-centered 
order of international relations which, by rejecting direct government to government 
exchanges, relegated China to the lowest "barbarian" level in the international hierarchy. 
This process was completed in the second decade of the eighteenth century44. 
On the non-government, intellectual level, for the Tokugawa Confucianists, the 
identification of their country with barbarian status could not be reconciled with the 
Japanese self-perception based on the mythology of imperial divinity. Consequently, just 
as Chinese ideas were naturalized to justify the Tokugawa order, it became necessary, in 
order to reconcile the contradictions created by the adoption of the Chinese system, to 
reinterpret the whole concept of Chuka so that it could designate the centrality of Japan 
itself. 
In the writings of the later nativist scholars, like Motoori, China functioned as a reminder 
of Japan's centrality and the original premises governing the Chukalbarbarian opposition 
were now reversed. With this reversal, so China's metaphorical function was also reversed 
and, as Harootunian says, "In the end the nativists transformed China to mean the Other; 
China, which had served metaphorically to convey the sense of civilization as juxtaposed 
with the rudeness of nature, was transformed into its opposite."45 This China, an exemplar 
of error, was just as dehistoricized and just as much a metaphor as the previous China which 
had served as the apotheosis of the good. 
Away from the intellectuals, the function of China in the popular imagination is more 
difficult to gauge. Harootunian observes that the term for imported goods, hakuraihin, 
acquired the meaning of goods produced from China exclusively, and that this identification 
came to mean "elegant products". Along with other evidence, this would seem to indicate 
that the popular view, at least to some extent, reflected the official and scholarly positions. 
Thus, in the early decades of the Tokugawa regime, Chinese doctrines, culture and produce 
were all esteemed over native accomplishments, but as the views of the kokugaku scholars 
gained prominence so China was seen increasingly as an "instance of decline" .46 
Studies of the popular perception of outsiders in the Tokugawa period bear out the 
contention that China gradually lost its singular definition as a specific geographic location 
44 Toby,pI97. 
45 Harootunian, p25. 
46 ibid. pI!. 
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and instead served, as it did among the elite, as a metaphor for the "other" or "outside". 
Part of the evidence for this is the way in which the term Tojin, which in early Tokugawa 
times referred only to Nagasaki's Chinese community, with a variety of other terms used for 
the non-Chinese outsiders, was gradually transformed into the generic term used to describe 
all foreigners, thus postulating a "this" Japan against any "other"47. The two Chinese 
characters making up the word Tojin are To - the character representing the Chinese T'ang 
dynasty, and fin - meaning person, and it has been suggested that the term was in no way 
complimentary in that it denied the millennium of Chinese history and all the dynasties that 
followed the T'ang. It is certainly the case that, as well as becoming a catch-all term for 
foreigners, it acquired another pejorative meaning, which persists even today, used to 
describe anyone perceived to be dull or lacking in wits. 
By the end of the eighteenth century, China's special role in Japan had all but disappeared. 
Import substitution programs saw Japan achieve economic self-sufficiency and as trade 
restrictions were gradually tightened so contacts declined. Of course, paralleling this 
diminishing role was the rising profile of the Western powers in Japan's consciousness. 
Spurred by shogun Yoshimune's relaxation of restrictions on imports of Western books, 
the new openings to Western knowledge appeared just at the time that Japanese scholars 
were growing dissatisfied with traditional learning. The apparent superiority of Western 
scholarship manifested itself clearly in fields such as medicine and astronomy and served to 
further discredit China and encouraged a movement away from reliance upon Chinese 
sources of learning. 
On an intellectual level, for most late Tokugawa writers, China was simply one more 
country among the nations of the world. No longer identified with civilization and 
excellence and with even trading contacts cut to a minimum, it lost its privileged position in 
Japan. Chinese concepts had been thoroughly naturalized and the kokugaku scholars 
regarded China with, if anything, contempt. Harootunian makes the point, "China, by 
losing its privileged position in discourse, [disappeared] as an object of serious 
consideration. "48 
If a common pattern in all of this can be discerned it is, perhaps, that in Tokugawa Japan 
both the "China of trade" and the "China of the mind" were first embraced and imitated and 
then adapted and, finally, once the adaptations proved to be workable, vilified and rejected. 
47 Jansen,p86-88. 
48 Harootunian, p29. 
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This is a pattern in Japan's dealings with the outside world, that has been repeated on many 
occasions and in many different fields down to the present day. 
APPENDIX 
Major Isolationist measures of the early Tokugawa Regime. 
(From Masayoshi Sugimoto & David L. Swain, Science and Culture in Traditional Japan, Tokyo: Tuttle, 
1989.p225) 
1616 Entry by foreign vessels was restricted to the two ports of Nagasaki and Hirado. 
1633-36 Successive prohibitions were placed on overseas travel and trade by any Japanese, and those 
already abroad were barred from returning to their homeland, upon penalty of death. 
1634 The shogunate ordered the Nagasaki merchants to build a tiny artificial island in Nagasaki harbour, 
and the Portuguese traders were ordered to move from Hirado to this island, called Dejima. 
1635 Construction of vessels capable of navigating the high seas was prohibited, and all such vessels were 
destroyed. 
1639 All Portuguese ships were banned from all Japanese ports; illegal attempts at entry were repelled by 
armed attack, and violators were put to death. (Spanish ships had already been banned in 1624; and 
the British, unable to compete successfully with the Dutch and Portuguese, had given up the Japan 
trade in 1623. 
1641 The Dutch trading company in Hirado was moved to Nagasaki and confined to Dejima. 
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